Commodity Taxation and international Trade in Imperfect Markets by Andreas Haufler et al.
Commodity Taxation and International Trade in
Imperfect Markets 1
Andreas Hau°er
University of GÄ ottingen and CESifo
Guttorm Schjelderup




1Paper presented at the 56th Congress of the International Institute of Public Fi-
nance (IIPF) in Seville, at the Annual Congress of the German Economic Association
in Berlin, and at seminars in Freiburg and Kiel. We are indebted to Thorsten Bayindir-
Upmann, Michael P°Ä uger and especially Agnar Sandmo for helpful comments. This paper
was started while Schjelderup and StÄ ahler visited the University of Konstanz and contin-
ued while Hau°er and StÄ ahler were at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration in Bergen. We wish to thank both institutions for their hospitality. Finan-
cial support from the Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE) at the University of
Konstanz and the Norwegian Research Council, grant number 137114/510, is gratefully
acknowledged.Abstract
This paper studies non-cooperative commodity taxation in a trade model with im-
perfect competition and trade costs. Nationally optimal tax policy simultaneously
tries to correct the domestic distortion from imperfect competition and to shift rents
to the home country. Importantly, this trade-o® depends qualitatively on the inter-
national commodity tax regime in operation. For low levels of trade costs, we show
that production-based commodity taxes dominate from a global welfare perspective,
but this ranking is reversed in favor of consumption-based taxation when trade costs
become su±ciently high.
Keywords: commodity taxation, imperfect competition, strategic trade policy
JEL-Classi¯cation: F12, H20.1 Introduction
In 1999, revenues from taxes on goods and services represented 12.6 and 8 percent
of GDP in the EU and the OECD, respectively, making indirect taxes the most
important source of tax revenue in the EU and the third most important source in
the OECD.1 Among the various indirect taxes used, the value-added tax (VAT) is
by far the most important. While only nine countries levied this tax in the 1960s,
this number has meanwhile increased to more than one hundred (Cnossen, 1998).
The VAT is used by all OECD countries, except the United States, and it has
also become increasingly popular in developing countries. It is now employed by all
Latin American countries, as well as many African and ex-communist economies
of Eastern Europe. The VAT is also proposed as an alternative tax in the United
States, since the existing system of retail sales taxes has been repeatedly criticized
as an ine±cient way of raising tax revenue (Mikesell, 1997).2
The success of the VAT can be attributed to at least two factors. First, since VAT is
paid at each stage of production, it is very di±cult to avoid. Second, the increased
mobility of national income tax bases { capital income, in particular { has led many
countries to increase their reliance on commodity taxes. The increased dependence
on VAT and the deepening of international economic integration make it important,
however, to study the international repercussions of national commodity taxes. In
particular, a core policy issue is whether traded commodities should be taxed in
the country of consumption (destination principle), or in the country of production
(origin principle). This question has been debated in the European Union since its
founding days, and it has re-gained a prominent place in policy discussions due to the
abolition of border controls in the internal market (see Keen and Smith, 1996). Its
relevance is, however, not con¯ned to the EU but applies equally to other integrating
nations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, or to federal economies
with some subnational tax autonomy (e.g. Canada, Brazil, India and the U.S.).
1In the OECD, the largest source of tax revenue is derived from personal income (9.3% of GDP),
followed by social security taxes (9.3%) and taxes on goods and services (8%). See OECD (1999).
2Rates of sales taxation in the United States are, on average, below 8 percent, compared with a
total OECD average for the VAT of almost 20 percent. As a consequence, revenue from consumption
taxes are much lower in the US than in the rest of the OECD. See OECD (1999).
1From a theoretical perspective, the issue of how commodity taxes should be levied is
closely related to the theory of economic integration and international trade policy.
If economic integration is perfect in the sense that goods and consumers can move
without costs across borders, a jurisdiction that sets its tax rate above that of other
countries will ¯nd that no tax revenue can be raised. The literature on international
commodity taxation has shown that production taxes { but not consumption taxes
{ give rise to tax base externalities and will generally cause governments to set tax
rates too low in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (Mintz and Tulkens, 1986;
Kanbur and Keen, 1993). In the presence of additional terms of trade e®ects strategic
motives also appear under the destination principle (Lockwood, 1993), but this is
of concern only if countries are large in the world economy. Hence the possibility to
avoid mutually destructive beggar-thy-neighbor policies has been one of the most
important arguments for consumption-based commodity taxation.3
The importance of international ¯scal externalities caused by national commodity
taxes suggests that public ¯nance and trade theorists could bene¯t from working
jointly on these issues. Nevertheless, there has been remarkably little interchange
between the two ¯elds of research. One important dividing line between international
public ¯nance on the one hand and modern international trade theory on the other
seems to be that the literature on international taxation and tax competition has
remained largely within the competitive paradigm while most of the modern trade
literature focuses on imperfectly competitive product markets.
In the `new' international trade literature, it is well established that the presence of
imperfect competition o®ers an increased range for strategic trade policies, even for
small countries. A variety of di®erent scenarios has been analyzed, leading to very
di®erent conclusions as to whether trade should be taxed or subsidized from the
perspective of a home government maximizing national welfare (e.g. Brander and
Spencer, 1984, 1985; Eaton and Grossman, 1986). In almost all instances, however,
the focus has been on trade taxes, which allow governments to discriminate between
the tax treatment of foreigners and domestic agents. But one of the core implications
3The other core argument is that the destination principle, but not the origin principle, is
compatible with production e±ciency when tax rates di®er across countries and ¯rms behave
competitively. A detailed recent survey of these issues is given in Lockwood (1998).
2of market integration has been precisely that such discriminatory trade taxes are
largely abolished, at least among industrialized countries.
One of the few contributions to the literature on international commodity taxation
that departs from the assumption of competitive product markets is a recent paper
by Keen and Lahiri (1998).4 Using a duopoly model with integrated national mar-
kets they argue for both cooperative and non-cooperative tax policies that imperfect
competition is likely to reverse the general presumption in favor of the destination
principle that emerges from models with perfectly competitive markets. One major
¯nding in their paper is that in a symmetric Cournot duopoly with non-cooperative
tax setting the origin principle achieves the ¯rst best, whereas the same is not
true under the destination principle. The trade model of Keen and Lahiri is not
able, however, to capture the well-established empirical fact of intra-industry trade.
Furthermore, their analytical set-up does not allow an investigation of trade liber-
alization, which has been a core issue in the recent international trade literature.
In the present paper we bring together public ¯nance and trade theory and analyze
the above-mentioned choice between destination- and origin-based commodity taxes
in a framework of non-cooperative tax setting under imperfect competition. In com-
parison to Keen and Lahiri (1998), we introduce additional model elements that are
characteristic for the `new' trade theory. First, we account for the fact that trade
among industrialized countries is predominantly of the intra-industry type, so that
the trade model used should be able to explain this phenomenon. Second, and more
important for our results, the existence of trade costs is an integral element of our
analysis. A trade model which meets these requirements and simultaneously allows
for strategic interactions between ¯rms is the `reciprocal dumping' model of Brander
and Krugman (1983). In this model two-way trade in homogeneous products arises
from the assumption that national markets are segmented rather than integrated.
Furthermore, trade costs play a dual role as they a®ect duopolistic competition
between ¯rms and also add a real resource cost to international transactions.5
4Imperfect competition has also been introduced in some recent analyses of environmental tax
competition (Markusen, Morey and Olewiler, 1995; Rauscher, 1995; Hoel, 1997) and capital tax
competition (e.g. Janeba, 1998; Osmundsen, Hagen and Schjelderup, 1998; Hau°er and Wooton,
1999). For an overview, see Wilson (1999).
5An alternative framework which accounts for intra-industry trade is a model with heteroge-
3The importance of trade costs has been emphasized in much of the recent inter-
national trade literature. From a theoretical perspective, trade costs allow to in-
corporate a `home bias' in international trade patterns (Krugman, 1980), and they
can also be used to explain successive phases of diverging and converging develop-
ments between industrial cores and the periphery (Krugman and Venables, 1995).
Summarizing the empirical evidence, Norman (1998, p. 62) concludes:
\Even allowing for imperfect competition, studies show that the pattern
of market shares seen in European markets can be made consistent with
pro¯t maximizing ¯rms only if the sum of natural and arti¯cial barri-
ers to trade is equivalent to tari®s of 30-60 percent, depending on the
product."
Our main ¯nding is that the existence of trade costs in a model with segmented
markets leads to conclusions that di®er signi¯cantly from those derived in previous
work. With imperfect competition and non-cooperative behavior by governments,
tax policy is set to achieve two goals. The ¯rst is to correct the market failure
that stems from oligopolistic competition, while the second pertains to the use of
the tax system as a way to shift rents to the domestic economy. Whether nationally
optimal taxation is consistent with global welfare maximization depends on both the
tax principle in operation and the level of economic integration. In the absence of
trade costs, we con¯rm the result of Keen and Lahiri (1998, Proposition 6) that the
outcome of non-cooperative tax setting under the origin principle Pareto dominates
the Nash equilibrium allocation under the destination principle. However, we also
show that the e±ciency case for the destination principle reappears when trade costs
are introduced. Hence, in the presence of trade costs, imperfect competition does
not generally lead to an argument in favor of production-based commodity taxation.
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model and analyzes optimal tax policy with destination-based commodity taxes.
neous goods and monopolistic competition, as ¯rst used in Krugman (1979). This model, however,
has no strategic interaction between ¯rms and the existence of di®erentiated products makes it dif-
¯cult to compare its results with those of Keen and Lahiri (1998), where products are homogeneous.
4Section 3 performs the same analysis for origin-based commodity taxation and com-
pares the level of tax rates under the two regimes. Section 4 compares global welfare
under the destination and origin principles when taxes are set non-cooperatively.
Section 5 concludes and discusses some possible extensions of our analysis.
2 The model with consumption taxes
The basic structure of our model is adopted from the reciprocal dumping model of
Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983). We consider two countries, home
and foreign, which are identical in all respects. We thus explain the basic setup of
the model from the viewpoint of the domestic country only; all foreign variables
{ denoted by an asterisk { are derived analogously. There are two goods, X and
Z, where goods produced in di®erent countries are perfect substitutes. Good X is
produced in an oligopolistic industry whereas the numeraire good Z is produced in
a perfectly competitive sector. The preferences of the representative consumer are
given by the quasi-linear utility function
U(X;Z) = u(X) + Z; (1)
where u(X) is three times di®erentiable with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
The consumer is endowed with a ¯xed amount of labor (L). Labor is the only fac-
tor of production and is intersectorally mobile, but internationally immobile. Labor
units are measured such that one unit of labor produces one unit of commodity Z,
implying that the wage rate is equal to unity. In addition to wage income the rep-
resentative consumer receives all pro¯ts (¦) earned by the domestic ¯rm in the
oligopolistic market. Furthermore, following a standard procedure in the trade lit-
erature we assume that tax revenue T is returned to the consumer as a lump sum.
Thus, the social valuation of one dollar of tax revenues is equal to the marginal
utility of the numeraire good Z. Denoting the consumer price of good X by p, the
consumer's budget constraint is given by
L + ¦ + T = pX + Z: (2)
Utility maximization subject to the budget constraint (2) yields the demand function
for good X which, under the chosen utility function, depends only on relative prices.




00(X) < 0: (3)
Production in the oligopolistic industry X requires c units of labor per unit of
production and ¯xed costs of F > 0 to set up a production plant. F is assumed to
be su±ciently high so that only one ¯rm in each country is able to make positive
pro¯ts. Hence there are two identical ¯rms in our model, each located in one market.
The two ¯rms engage in Cournot quantity competition in each of the two markets.
Exports of either ¯rm to the other market cause trade costs of s per unit of the good
shipped. Following standard notation in the trade literature, x describes the sales of
the domestic ¯rm in the home country and y are the home country's imports from
the foreign ¯rm. Hence, aggregate consumption in the home market is X = x + y,
and the inverse demand function is p(x+y). Analogously, aggregate demand in the
foreign market is X¤ = x¤ + y¤, where x¤ are the foreign ¯rm's sales in the foreign
country (i.e., its domestic market) and y¤ are the home ¯rm's exports to the foreign
market.
A commodity tax at rate t is levied on the good produced in the oligopolistic in-
dustry X. In this section we focus on destination-based taxes, which fall on the
consumption of good X. Note that the commodity tax considered here is selective,
so that destination- and origin-based commodity taxes have di®erent real e®ects.6
We model taxes to be speci¯c rather than ad valorem. This is done for analytical
simplicity, and in order to facilitate comparison with the modeling of speci¯c tari®s
in most of the trade literature.7
Under the destination principle, the home tax rate t is levied on domestic and foreign
goods sold in the home market (x and y), whereas the foreign tax rate t¤ applies to
6A long standing issue in international taxation is under which conditions destination- and
origin-based commodity taxes can be equivalent. As emphasized by Lockwood, de Meza and Myles
(1994), it is the selectivity of the commodity tax which causes equivalence to break down, not the
presence of imperfect competition in product markets as such.
7It is well-known that in contrast to the competitive case, speci¯c and ad valorem taxes or
tari®s lead to di®erent outcomes under imperfect competition. See Helpman and Krugman (1989,
Ch. 4) for a comparison of speci¯c vs. ad valorem tari®s in trade policy, and Delipalla and Keen
(1992) for an analysis of this issue in the case of commodity taxation.
6all sales in the foreign country (x¤ and y¤). The pro¯t equations for the domestic
and the foreign ¯rm under the destination principle (superscript D) are
¦
D = (p ¡ c ¡ t) x + (p
¤ ¡ c ¡ s ¡ t
¤) y
¤ ¡ F; (4)
¦
¤D = (p
¤ ¡ c ¡ t
¤) x
¤ + (p ¡ c ¡ s ¡ t) y ¡ F: (5)
An important assumption in this model is that ¯rms perceive the two markets as
segmented. Since marginal costs are assumed constant, the pro¯t maximizing pro-
duction decisions for the home and the foreign market can be completely separated
(cf. Brander and Krugman, 1983). Furthermore, under the destination principle the
domestic tax rate a®ects only the domestic market. We can thus focus on the op-
timal levels of x and y chosen by the domestic and the foreign ¯rm, respectively,
for sale in the home market. The analysis for the foreign market will be completely
symmetric. The relevant ¯rst-order conditions are
¦
D
x = p ¡ c ¡ t + p
0x = 0; (6)
¦
¤D
y = p ¡ c ¡ s ¡ t + p
0y = 0; (7)
where subscript letters here and in the following denote partial derivatives. The ¯rst-
order conditions (6) and (7) give the two ¯rms' reaction functions in output space.
Note that (6) and (7) imply x > y for s > 0. Given that both ¯rms face identical
marginal costs and taxes under the destination principle, the domestic ¯rm will have
a larger market share in the home market since it does not incur trade costs.
The second-order conditions for a pro¯t maximum are
¦xx = 2p
0 + p




00y < 0: (8)
In the following, we impose the condition that the goods are strategic substitutes in
the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985):
¦xy = p
0 + p




00y < 0: (9)
Condition (9) guarantees that the reaction curves are negatively sloped so that
the optimal reaction of a ¯rm to output expansion of the rival ¯rm is to reduce
its own output. Comparing (9) with (8) shows that the assumption of strategic
7substitutability implies the su±cient second-order condition for a pro¯t maximum.
Finally, it follows from conditions (8) and (9) that the determinant of the Jacobian









00(x + y) > 0: (10)
Condition (10) implies that each ¯rm's own quantity choice has a larger e®ect on its
marginal pro¯ts than the output choice of the competing ¯rm, thus ensuring rea-
sonable comparative statics results. To determine social welfare in the home country
we use the budget constraint (2) to substitute out for Z in the individual's utility
function (1). Domestic welfare under the destination principle is then given by
W
D = u(¢) ¡ p(¢)(x + y) + ¦
D + L + (x + y)t; (11)
where (¢) refers to the functional argument (x+y). The ¯rst two terms in (11) give
the consumer surplus in the oligopolistic industry, which is an exact welfare measure
under the quasi-linear utility function assumed here. Maximizing (11) with respect
to t and using u0 = p from (3) yields in a ¯rst step
W
D




t ) t + ¦
D
t = 0: (12)
To obtain the non-cooperative equilibrium tax rate under the destination principle,
we di®erentiate the domestic ¯rm's pro¯ts [eq. (4)] to get8
¦
D
t = (pt(¢) ¡ 1) x + (p ¡ c ¡ t) x
D
t :
Furthermore, pt(¢) = p0(¢)(xD
t +yD
t ). Finally we use p0x = p0y¡s, which follows from
the ¯rms' ¯rst-order conditions (6) and (7). Rearranging and solving for the home
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8In the following we assume that the second-order conditions for a national welfare maximum
are ful¯lled under both tax principles, i.e., Wtt < 0. Furthermore, we assume that a unique and
symmetric Nash equilibrium exists in the present model.
8In equation (13) we have identi¯ed two main e®ects, which we label (I) e±ciency
e®ect and (II) rent shifting e®ect. Each of these e®ects can be further broken down
into two parts. The e±ciency e®ect consists of a term for the change in domestic
consumption and a term for the e±ciency costs of international trade. The rent
shifting e®ect incorporates a pro¯t shifting term in the home market and a tax
exporting e®ect.9
To interpret and sign the di®erent e®ects, we need to determine the general equi-
librium responses of x and y to the change in the domestic tax rate t. These are





















where jJj > 0 from (10).10
From (13) and (14) it follows that the e±ciency e®ect (I) is ambiguous under the des-
tination principle. The ¯rst (domestic) part of the e±ciency e®ect is clearly negative
and describes the familiar incentive to increase the suboptimally low consumption
of the oligopolistically produced good X by means of a subsidy. The second (trade-
related) part of this e®ect is positive (negative) if xD
t > 0 (xD
t < 0). It re°ects that
an increase (reduction) in domestic production following a tax increase will reduce
(increase) imports for any given level of domestic demand (controlled by the ¯rst
e®ect), thereby saving (increasing) excess trade costs borne by domestic consumers.
The rent shifting e®ect (II) is unambiguously positive under the destination princi-
ple. The ¯rst term depends again on the sign of xD
t as a positive response of domestic
production to a tax increase implies that pro¯ts are shifted from the foreign to the
9The pro¯t shifting term is also labeled terms of trade e®ect in parts of the literature.
10Note that the sign of xD
t is ambiguous, in general. Recalling that x ¸ y, xt < 0 follows
unambiguously if the inverse demand function is convex (p00 > 0). In the opposite case of concave
inverse demand (p00 < 0), however, domestic production may rise in response to a domestic tax
increase, if trade costs are high and (y ¡ x) is large in absolute value. Intuitively, p00 < 0 implies
that demand is more elastic at low levels of output so that the tax increase will a®ect imports more
than domestic production. In contrast, yD
t < 0 is always ful¯lled from the assumption of strategic
substitutability (9). Furthermore, aggregate consumption xD
t +yD
t always falls in response to a tax
increase, since p0 < 0 from (3).
9domestic ¯rm. The tax exporting e®ect in the second term is unambiguously posi-
tive, however, since the consumption tax falls partly on imports (y) and thus shifts
rents from the foreign ¯rm to the domestic treasury. Furthermore, substituting xD
t
from (14) and using (10) and (9), it can be shown that the positive tax exporting
e®ect will dominate the pro¯t shifting term, even if the latter is negative.
Having discussed the basic e®ects in detail, we can now substitute the results in (14)




s[p0 + p00 (y ¡ x)]
2p0 : (15)
From (15) it is immediately seen that the balance between the competing e®ects
depends critically on the curvature of the demand function.11 The results for non-
cooperative taxation under the destination principle can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1: (a) Under the destination principle, the nationally optimal tax rate
is negative for all levels of trade costs, if the inverse demand function is convex
(p00 > 0). (b) If inverse demand is concave (p00 < 0), then the optimal tax rate is
positive at s = 0 and it is positive at higher levels of s, i® xD
t > 0.
Proof: Part (a) of the Proposition follows immediately from substituting p00 > 0
into (15) and noting from y · x that the second term in (15) is unambiguously
negative in this case. For (b) we use p00 < 0 and either substitute s = 0 or use the
expression for xD
t in (14). 2
Intuitively, the curvature of the demand function determines how e®ective a subsidy
is in raising domestic output. If the inverse demand function is convex (p00 > 0)
then the demand increase following a subsidy is large and the incentive to raise
domestic consumption by means of a subsidy is strong.12 In contrast, if p00 < 0
then a tax increase causes only a moderate fall in domestic consumption and this
e®ect is relatively weak. The nationally optimal tax will then be positive if trade
costs are zero and the rent shifting term (II) is accordingly strong (because trade
11This is a well-known result from closed-economy models analyzing tax incidence and optimal
taxation under conditions of imperfect competition. See, e.g., Myles (1995, Ch. 11).
12To see this analytically, note from (10) that p00 > 0 reduces the absolute value of the Jacobian
determinant. As shown by the last term in (14), this leads to a larger fall in aggregate demand for
good X in response to a tax increase.
10levels and thus foreign pro¯ts in the domestic market are high). In addition, the
destination-based tax may also turn positive at higher levels of s. The rent shifting
e®ect will then be weak, but the e±ciency e®ect turns positive if xD
t > 0 and a tax
increase raises domestic production and reduces trade costs. Finally, note that in the
special case of a linear inverse demand function (p00 = 0) and zero trade costs, the
counteracting incentives just o®set each other and the non-cooperative consumption
tax is zero.
These results can be compared to previous ¯ndings in the literature on strategic
trade policy. In Brander and Spencer (1984, Propositions 1 and 2) the sign of the
nationally optimal import tari® also depends on the curvature of demand. However,
in their analysis the borderline case of a linear demand function involves a positive
tari® at s = 0, whereas this demand function implies a zero consumption tax in
the present analysis. This di®erence is easily explained from the fact that the tari®
a®ects only the imports of good X and thus can be directly targeted at the rents
that accrue to foreign producers in the home market. In contrast, a consumption
tax simultaneously raises the price of domestically produced goods and thus implies
a more severe underconsumption of good X for any given level of rent shifting.
3 Production taxes
Under the origin principle, commodity taxes are levied in the country of production
rather than in the country of ¯nal consumption. Hence the home country's tax rate
t now applies to the domestic sales of the home ¯rm (x) and to its exports to the
foreign country (y¤). Analogously, the foreign tax rate (t¤) applies to the foreign
¯rm's sales in each of the two countries (x¤ and y). The pro¯ts of the domestic and
the foreign ¯rm under the origin principle (superscript O) are
¦
O = (p ¡ c ¡ t) x + (p
¤ ¡ c ¡ s ¡ t) y
¤ ¡ F; (16)
¦
¤O = (p
¤ ¡ c ¡ t
¤) x
¤ + (p ¡ c ¡ s ¡ t
¤) y ¡ F: (17)
An important di®erence to the analysis in the previous section is that the domestic
tax rate now a®ects both the home and the foreign market. Hence we need to
determine the optimal levels of output that both ¯rms produce for each market.
11The ¯rst-order conditions are
¦
O
x = p ¡ c ¡ t + p
0x = 0; (18)
¦
¤O
y = p ¡ c ¡ s ¡ t
¤ + p




¤ ¡ c ¡ t
¤ + p
¤0x




¤ ¡ c ¡ s ¡ t + p
¤0y
¤ = 0: (21)
Again the su±cient second-order conditions for a maximum will be implied by the
assumption of strategic substitutability in both markets. These conditions are un-
changed from eq. (9) above.
Welfare in the home country under the origin principle is given by
W
O = u(¢) ¡ p(¢)(x + y) + ¦
O + L + (x + y
¤)t; (22)
where the tax base now includes the home country's exports of good X, rather than
its imports. Using u0 = p yields in a ¯rst step
W
O





t ) + ¦
O
t = 0:
The e®ects of a tax increase on the domestic ¯rm's pro¯ts are slightly more compli-
cated than under the destination principle. Di®erentiating (16) gives
¦
O






¤ ¡ c ¡ s ¡ t)y
¤O
t :
Also, pt(¢) = p0(¢)(xO
t +yO
t ) and p¤
t(¢) = p¤0(¢)(x¤O
t +y¤O
t ). Finally, p0x = p0y¡s again
follows from the ¯rms' optimality conditions (18) and (19), and the fact that t = t¤
in the symmetric equilibrium. Solving for the home government's nationally optimal
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The e±ciency e®ect (I) is analogous in structure to the optimal tax formula under
the destination principle [eq. (13)]. The rent shifting e®ect (II) again incorporates
a pro¯t shifting term in the home market (the ¯rst term), but the tax exporting
12motive under the destination principle is now replaced by a pro¯t shifting e®ect in
the foreign market (the second term).







































where jJj > 0 from (10), jJ¤j > 0 from symmetry and we have used the assumption
of strategic substitutability [eq. (9)] to sign the terms.13
The e±ciency e®ect (I) is unambiguously negative under the origin principle. The
¯rst term in (I) again captures the motive to correct for the domestic consumption
ine±ciency by means of a subsidy. Note, however, that this term will, ceteris paribus,
be less strong than the corresponding e®ect under the destination principle because a
production subsidy is only an imperfect instrument to raise domestic consumption in
an open-economy setting.14 The second e®ect in (I) is also unambiguously negative
under the origin principle since a domestic production tax will reduce domestic
production and increase imports (cf. footnote 13), thus raising the excess trade
costs borne by domestic consumers.
The rent shifting e®ect (II) is also unambiguously negative under the origin principle
and thus has the opposite sign than under a consumption-based commodity tax.
The ¯rst term in (II) shows that a positive production tax shifts pro¯ts in the home
13In contrast to the destination principle [eq.(14)], all output changes caused by a domestic tax
increase are unambiguous under the origin principle. Since the tax falls only on domestic producers,
it will lower the sales of the domestic ¯rm in both the home market (x) and the foreign market
(y¤). The contraction in supply induces a price rise which in turn leads the foreign ¯rm { which is
una®ected by the tax { to increase its supply in both markets (x¤ and y, respectively). Aggregate
consumption, however, must fall in both national markets.
14Algebraically, note from (24) that xO
t +yO
t in the ¯rst term of (23) work in opposite directions,
whereas xO
t + y¤O
t in the denominator of (23) have the same sign. Hence, the weight attached to
this e®ect is lower than under the destination principle, where the corresponding terms simplify to
unity [see eq. (13)].
13market towards the foreign ¯rm, whereas the second term describes a parallel e®ect
in the foreign market. Vice versa, a subsidy can be used to increase the pro¯t share
of the domestic ¯rm in both national markets.





4p0 + p00 (x + y)
; (25)
and our results are summarized in
Proposition 2: Under the origin principle, the nationally optimal tax rate is neg-
ative for all levels of trade costs.
Proof: This follows directly from (25) and strategic substitutability [eq. (9)]. 2
Proposition 2 shows that commodity taxes levied under the origin principle lead
to results that resemble the case for strategic export subsidies, aimed at increas-
ing the domestic ¯rm's market share in a foreign market (Brander and Spencer,
1985). Together, our Propositions 1 and 2 thus encompass two of the main beggar-
thy-neighbor strategies analyzed in the literature on strategic trade policy: (i) the
incentive to shift pro¯ts from the foreign ¯rm to the home treasury through an im-
port tari®; and (ii) the incentive to shift pro¯ts from the foreign to the domestic ¯rm
through an export subsidy. Which of these two strategic incentives is at work in a
commodity tax setting depends only on the international tax principle in operation.
Based on Propositions 1 and 2, we ¯nally compare the non-cooperative tax rates
under the destination and origin principles. It turns out that this comparison is less
clear-cut than may appear at ¯rst sight. Our results are summarized in
Proposition 3: (a) The nationally optimal tax rate is higher under the destination
principle, if the inverse demand function is concave (p00 < 0) or if trade costs are
zero. (b) The optimal tax rate is higher under the origin principle, if the inverse
demand function is convex (p00 > 0) and trade costs are su±ciently high.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 can be directly related to our earlier interpretation of eqs. (13)
and (23), and in particular to the e±ciency and the rent shifting e®ects. The com-
parison of Nash equilibrium tax rates under the two tax principles depends on two
counteracting forces. On the one hand, the negative e±ciency e®ect in the home
14market [the ¯rst term in (I)] is stronger under the destination principle, since the
subsidy can be directly targeted at domestic consumption. On the other hand, the
rent shifting e®ect (II) raises the optimal tax rate under the destination principle
(sign of e®ect is positive), but lowers it under the origin principle (sign of e®ect is
negative). Hence, it is intuitive that ^ tD > ^ tO holds when trade costs are zero (or
very low). When trade costs are high, ^ tD > ^ tO will also hold if p00 < 0; since the
incentive to subsidize domestic consumption is then relatively weak. However, when
the domestic e±ciency e®ect is strong (p00 > 0) and the rent shifting terms are neg-
ligible (trade costs are high), then the failure of the origin principle to fully correct
for imperfect competition implies that ^ tD < ^ tO.
4 Welfare comparison of tax principles
The analysis in the preceding sections has pointed out the di®erent strategic incen-
tives that exist for national tax policy under consumption- and production-based
commodity taxation, leading to di®erent equilibrium tax levels. The ¯nal objective
of our paper is to compare the welfare levels that each country can obtain under the
two alternative tax principles when tax rates are set non-cooperatively. The policy
idea that underlies this analytical setting is that an international agreement on tax
principles is far easier to reach than an agreement on tax rates. The relevance of this
scenario is clearly demonstrated by the strong resistance of many member states of
the European Union towards a further harmonization of value-added tax rates.
As a ¯rst step in this analysis, we derive the optimal tax formula that would result
under aggregate welfare maximization and use it as a benchmark for the comparison
of the two commodity tax regimes. In our symmetric setting, the optimal tax policy
is equivalent to a coordinated tax policy under either the destination or the origin
principle; hence, it does not matter whether we maximize joint utility under the
¯rst or the latter. There is, however, a clear expository advantage in determining the
optimal tax rate under the destination principle. Under this tax scheme the national
markets for good X are independent and consumer surplus in each national market
is a®ected only by the domestic commodity tax rate. Therefore, it is su±cient to
consider the spillovers of domestic tax policy on the foreign ¯rm's pro¯ts and thus
15choose the domestic tax rate so as to maximize the sum of domestic consumer surplus
and the pro¯ts of both ¯rms. By the symmetry of the model the foreign tax rate
will be identical and the solution represents an aggregate global welfare optimum.
Denoting all values that obtain under global welfare maximization by a tilde, the
objective function is given by
~ W = u(¢) ¡ p(x + y) + (x + y)t + L + ¦
D + ¦
¤D; (26)
where the di®erence to (11) lies in the additional term for the pro¯ts of the foreign














































which can be further reduced, using (14):
~ t = p
0y ¡
s[p0 + p00 (y ¡ x)]
2p0 : (28)
In general, the optimal coordinated tax rate balances the competing considerations
to (i) correct the domestic underconsumption of good X in both countries and (ii)
ensure an e±cient level of trade. In the special case of zero trade costs, two-way
trade yields no e±ciency loss and only the domestic correction motive is operating.
In this case the second term in (28) is zero and the optimal tax is unambiguously
negative. When s is increased, the market power of each national ¯rm rises in its
home market, increasing the need for a consumption subsidy. At the same time,
however, two-way trade involves rising levels of wasteful trade costs. In the neigh-
borhood of the autarky equilibrium, trade levels are unambiguously too high from a
global welfare perspective (Brander and Krugman, 1983) and an optimal trade tax
would be unambiguously positive. The sign of the optimal commodity tax is ambigu-
ous, however, since a positive tax also aggravates the domestic underconsumption
of good X.
The next step is to compare (28) with the nationally optimal tax rate under the
destination and the origin principle, respectively. We will consider two special cases
16{ zero trade costs and trade costs that make it optimal to eliminate all trade { and
show that the welfare ranking between the two tax principles is reversed when we
move from low to high levels of s.
Since the second-order conditions for national welfare maximization are assumed to
hold in the present analysis, and Wt(t) is continuous and quasi-concave under both
tax principles, it is possible to link tax rates and welfare levels in an unambiguous
way. In particular, if one of the non-cooperative tax rates (^ tD, ^ tO) coincides with
the optimal coordinated tax rate ~ t for a speci¯c level of transport costs s, then the
corresponding tax principle must (weakly) dominate the other in this point.
We ¯rst turn to the case where the level of trade costs is zero. As discussed above,
the Pareto optimal tax rate is then unambiguously negative, as two-way trade causes
no e±ciency losses and tax policy serves the sole purpose of correcting the domestic
distortions in the two national markets for good X. For this case we get:
Proposition 4: For zero trade costs (s = 0), the origin principle (strongly) welfare
dominates the destination principle, that is ^ W D
¯ ¯ ¯
s=0




Proof: Setting s = 0 in (15), (25) and (28) gives
^ t
O = ~ t = p
0y and ^ t
D = ¡p
00xy:
The taxes ^ tD and ^ tO coincide if and only if p0 = ¡p00x () p0+p00x = 0, which violates
the assumption that the commodities are strategic substitutes [eq.(9)]. 2
To understand this result, it is helpful to return to the detailed optimal tax formulae
under the two tax principles, as developed in the preceding sections [eqs. (13) and
(23)]. The e±ciency term (I) is the same under the destination-based tax [eq. (13)]
and the optimal tax [eq. (27)], if both are evaluated at s = 0. This shows that
the consumption-based tax in each country fully internalizes the optimal subsidy to
correct for the domestic distortion. Hence, the non-cooperative tax rate under the
destination principle will diverge from the optimal tax rate by the rent shifting e®ect
(II). Since this e®ect is unambiguously positive under the destination principle, the
nationally optimal tax rate ^ tD will always be `too high' (i.e., subsidies are `too low')
from the perspective of global welfare maximization.
Under the origin principle [eq. (23)], the e±ciency e®ect (I) falls short of the op-
timal subsidy [eq. (27)] at s = 0, since the tax a®ects only that part of domestic
17consumption which is also domestically produced. However, the rent shifting e®ect
(II) also works in the direction of a subsidy. In a symmetric model, and in the ab-
sence of trade costs, both ¯rms share both markets equally and the strategic rent
shifting e®ect just makes up for the incomplete incentive to subsidize domestic con-
sumption. Hence, even though governments set tax rates non-cooperatively, the sum
of all e®ects under the origin principle is just as large as in the aggregate welfare
optimum.
Our Proposition 4 is closely related to Proposition 6 in Keen and Lahiri (1998). In
the absence of trade costs, Keen and Lahiri show that non-cooperative tax setting
under the origin principle is able to attain the ¯rst best solution if both countries
are identical and trade costs are absent, whereas the same is not true under the
destination principle. Our model reproduces this result for s = 0, and it also o®ers
an explanation that is related to the strategic rent shifting incentives known from
the international trade literature.15 As we have argued above, it is the complete
symmetry of the model in the absence of trade costs which ensures that the strategic
rent shifting motive is an exact complement to the partial incentive to correct the
domestic distortion. This, however, is no longer true when positive trade costs are
introduced.
We now turn to the other limiting case where trade costs are so high that the optimal
policy is to eliminate all trade. In the following we denote by ~ s the (minimal) level
of trade costs for which the optimal tax ~ t implies y = y¤ = 0. The sign of ~ t is
generally ambiguous at ~ s, as the tax trades o® the competing incentives to correct
the domestic distortion on the one hand, and to cut o® ine±cient levels of trade
on the other. It is important to emphasize that non-cooperative tax policy under
the destination and origin principles need not eliminate trade at the same level of
trade costs ~ s; instead, this will be true if and only if the nationally optimal tax rate
coincides with the optimal tax rate at s = ~ s. The following proposition shows that
15Note also that with complete symmetry and zero trade costs the di®erence between the inte-
grated market assumption in Keen and Lahiri (1998) and the segmented markets model assumed
here is immaterial: even if ¯rms are permitted to charge di®erent prices in the home and the foreign
market, they will not do so if trade costs are zero. This can be seen directly from eqs. (18) and (21)
by setting s = 0 and x = y¤.
18the destination principle always implies an e±cient level of trade at s = ~ s whereas
this is not generally true under the origin principle.
Proposition 5: At the level of trade costs that eliminates all trade under an optimal
tax policy (s = ~ s), the destination principle (weakly) welfare dominates the origin







Proof: For each of ^ tD, ^ tO and ~ t we assume that trade is eliminated by setting




y=0 ´ ~ t
¯ ¯
s=~ s. Noting from (6){(7) that y is a monotonously falling function of s,
it must then also be true that ^ tD¯ ¯
s=~ s = ~ t
¯ ¯
s=~ s. In contrast, ^ tO and ~ t coincide for
y = 0 if and only if 2p0=(4p0 + p00y) = (p0 ¡p00y)=2p0. The only demand speci¯cation
which ful¯lls this condition and simultaneously meets the assumption of strategic
substitutability [eq. (9)] is the linear inverse demand function (p00 = 0). In all other
cases ^ tO¯ ¯
y=0 6= ~ t
¯ ¯
s=~ s, implying from the monotonicity of y in s [cf. eqs. (18){(19)]
that ^ tO¯ ¯
s=~ s 6= ~ t
¯ ¯
s=~ s : 2
Intuitively, as trade costs approach prohibitively high levels the rent shifting e®ects
(II) become less important under both tax principles and e±ciency e®ects domi-
nate. It is then seen from the comparison of eqs. (13) and (27) that non-cooperative
taxation under the destination principle fully internalizes the optimal trade-o® be-
tween an e±cient level of domestic consumption and an e±cient level of international
trade. The reason is that, in each country, the destination-based tax can be targeted
directly at the domestic underconsumption of good X, and it also incorporates all
trade costs that must be borne by domestic consumers. In contrast, the origin-based
tax deviates from the optimal tax in two respects: On the one hand, it neglects
the import component of domestic demand, implying that the subsidy for domestic
consumption is too low. On the other hand, it also neglects the trade costs borne by
foreign consumers, leading to excessive subsidization of domestic exports. The net
e®ect of these two deviations from the optimal tax rate at s = ~ s depends again on
the curvature of the domestic demand function.
To see this in more detail, let us assume ¯rst that the inverse demand function is
concave (p00 < 0). In this case the e±ciency e®ect is relatively weak so that the
excessive subsidization of exports under the origin principle is the dominant e®ect.
This conforms with Proposition 3(a), which shows that ^ tD > ^ tO must hold at s = ~ s,
19if inverse demand is concave. Since ^ tD is the globally e±cient tax rate in this point,
^ tO must be `too low' from a global welfare perspective. Furthermore, trade levels
in the non-cooperative equilibrium are a monotonously falling function of national
tax rates. Therefore, non-cooperative commodity taxation under the origin principle
will still support positive levels of trade at s = ~ s, and this trade is globally welfare
reducing.
In the opposite case of a convex inverse demand function (p00 > 0), the motive
to subsidize domestic consumption is strong and the failure of the origin principle
to fully internalize this e®ect leads to a production tax that is `too high' from
a global welfare perspective. This conforms with Proposition 3(b), given that the
consumption-based tax rate is again optimal. Hence, under the origin principle trade
is cut o® at a level of trade costs below ~ s, implying `too little' trade in this range
of s. For either p00 < 0 or p00 > 0 the origin principle thus induces autarky at a level
of trade costs that di®ers from ~ s, where trade should be eliminated from a global
welfare perspective. The only exception arises in the `intermediate' case of linear
inverse demand (p00 = 0). In this special case the deviations from the optimal tax
rate are just o®setting, and non-cooperative taxation under the origin principle is
Pareto e±cient at s = ~ s.16
From Propositions 4 and 5 it is straightforward to develop our next, and ¯nal,
proposition:
Proposition 6: As trade costs increase from s = 0 to s = ~ s, there is at least one
critical level sc where the welfare ranking of the two tax principles is reversed, that
is ^ WD
¯ ¯ ¯
s<sc · ^ WO
¯ ¯ ¯
s<sc and ^ WD
¯ ¯ ¯
s>sc ¸ ^ WO
¯ ¯ ¯
s>sc .
Proof: All optimal tax rates must be continuous functions of s, since they depend
only on the ¯rst and second derivatives of the inverse demand function, which are
continuously di®erentiable. Furthermore, from the assumption that the second-order
conditions of the optimal tax problems are ful¯lled under both tax principles, it
follows that W(^ tD) and W(^ tO) are continuous and quasi-concave in t for any level
of s. Proposition 6 then follows directly from Propositions 4 and 5. 2
The intuition for Proposition 6 follows immediately from our earlier discussion. As
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trade costs increase, the importance of the strategic rent shifting e®ects is reduced,
and the non-cooperative tax rate under the destination principle approaches the op-
timal level. Thus, there must be a critical level of trade costs at which the advantage
of the destination principle to optimally trade o® domestic consumption e±ciency
and international trade e±ciency dominates the welfare comparison of the two tax
principles.
We illustrate our results in this section using the example of the square root utility
function u =
p
X. For this utility function, Figure 1 plots welfare levels under both
the destination and the origin principle as a function of trade costs.17
Note ¯rst that the welfare plots exhibit the U-shape typical for the reciprocal dump-
ing model. At low levels of trade costs, trade is bene¯cial (i.e., the pro-competitive
e®ect of trade dominates excess transportation costs) and increases in s are welfare
reducing. In contrast, trade is harmful at high levels of s (i.e., the loss from excess
trade costs exceeds the gains from increased consumption of good X) and a further
rise in transport costs is welfare increasing (cf. Brander and Krugman 1983).
17The detailed computations for this case are available from the authors upon request.
21Turning to our speci¯c analysis, Figure 1 shows that for low levels of s, a higher
welfare level can be achieved with origin-based commodity taxation, whereas the
destination principle dominates for high levels of s. The reversal of the welfare
ranking occurs at s = 0:127c, i.e. 12.7 % of the marginal production cost. This is
just in between the di®erent assumptions made by Markusen and Venables (1998) in
their simulation model of trade and foreign direct investment (10% and 15%), and
much lower than the trade cost estimates inferred from real-world trade patterns
(see the quote from Norman, 1998, in the introduction). In short, the example of
the square root utility function demonstrates that the reversal of the welfare ranking
between the destination and origin principles is not merely a theoretical curiosity,
but may well occur in an empirically relevant parameter range.18
Finally, we emphasize that the argument favoring the destination principle at high
levels of s does not depend on the symmetry assumption used in this model. As
we have seen in section 2, the destination principle allows to consider each market
separately, if marginal production costs are constant and identical across ¯rms. If
trade costs are high, the nationally optimal tax rate in each country systematically
incorporates the e±ciency terms that result from aggregate welfare maximization,
and this will remain true if countries di®er with respect to population size or con-
sumer preferences. In contrast, the superiority of the origin principle in the case of
zero trade costs depends crucially on the symmetry assumption, which ensures that
disparate e®ects (the incomplete domestic correction incentive and the rent shifting
incentive) add up to the optimal tax rate.
5 Conclusions
Our aim in this paper was to exploit some of the insights from the literature on strate-
gic trade policy in order to shed new light on the comparison between di®erent inter-
national commodity tax principles under imperfect competition. For this purpose,
18Note that for s > 0:174c the assumption of strategic substitutability is violated for the square
root utility function. However, since the reversal of the welfare ranking between the origin and
destination principles occurs within the permitted parameter range, this does not a®ect the main
conclusions from the example.
22we have set up a symmetric two-country model with segmented national markets
and trade costs in which both ¯rms and governments behave non-cooperatively. In
this framework, national tax policy faces a trade-o® between the incentive to correct
the domestic underconsumption of the good produced in the oligopolistic market,
and the motive to shift pro¯ts from the foreign ¯rm to the home country. We have
seen that the latter e®ect, and hence the trade-o® for national tax policy, depends
qualitatively on the tax principle in operation. Rent shifting will tend to raise the
optimal commodity tax rate if taxes are levied in the country of ¯nal consumption
(destination principle), but lower it if the tax base is domestic production (origin
principle).
Furthermore, our analysis has shown that the welfare comparison between the two
tax principles depends crucially on the level of trade costs. If trade costs are zero,
non-cooperative taxation under the origin principle is optimal, as an imperfect in-
centive to correct the domestic distortion in the goods market is just compensated by
a strategic rent shifting e®ect. This is the same result that Keen and Lahiri (1998)
have obtained in a model with integrated commodity markets. When trade costs
are introduced, however, the strategic rent shifting incentives become less relevant
while trade costs cause an element of pure waste that needs to be incorporated by
an optimal tax policy. This tilts the welfare comparison in favor of the destination
principle, which is able to trade o® the con°icting goals of domestic consumption
e±ciency and international trade e±ciency in a Pareto optimal way.
In addition, it should be emphasized that at least some of the simplifying features
used in our analysis are likely to understate the arguments in favor of the destination
principle. First, we have assumed the existence of lump-sum taxes. If distortive taxes
have to be levied instead, then a subsidization policy will be less appealing. This
tends to work against the origin principle, where subsidies are higher in most cases.19
Second, we have argued above that the symmetry of the trading countries is crucial
for the welfare dominance of the origin principle when trade costs are zero, whereas
the same restriction does not apply to the welfare dominance of the destination
19It has been shown by Keen and Lahiri (1998, Proposition 7) that with integrated national
markets this argument reverses the welfare ranking in favor of the destination principle even in the
absence of trade costs, if the shadow price of public revenues becomes su±ciently high.
23principle at high levels of trade costs. Hence, while a more general framework with
asymmetric countries will greatly complicate the analysis { and perhaps make it
intractable analytically { we expect that this extension generally strengthens the
welfare case in favor of consumption-based commodity taxation.
In sum, it seems by no means clear that imperfect competition in product markets
establishes a general case for production-based commodity taxation. Instead, wel-
fare comparisons depend crucially on a number of central model parameters, and
possibly also on the choice of the trade model itself. This opens up many new av-
enues for theoretical research, as well as empirical work assessing the quantitative
magnitude of critical variables. However, if the new international trade literature is
any guide, then it is unlikely that the emerging results based on models of imper-
fect competition are su±ciently robust to serve as a basis for actual tax policy. The
con°icting implications derived from models of strategic trade policy have led many
international trade theorists to return to the basic case for free trade as a `rule of
thumb' (see Krugman, 1987). In a similar way, we would argue that international
tax specialists should stress the robust virtues of destination-based commodity taxes
under conditions of perfect competition, even if these conditions are not generally
met in practice.
24Appendix
Derivation of eqs. (14) and (24):
Destination Principle [eq. (14)]: To obtain the general equilibrium changes in
the output levels x and y in response to a change in the domestic tax rate, we totally
di®erentiate the ¯rms' ¯rst-order conditions for pro¯t maximization ¦x(x;y;t) and
¦¤
y(x;y;t) [eqs. (6) and (7)]. This yields







ytdt = 0: (A.1)
Substituting the second-order derivatives given in eqs. (8){(9) and ¦xt = ¦¤
yt = ¡1
into (A.1) yields the simultaneous equation system
2
4 2p0 + p00x p0 + p00x













Applying Cramer's rule to (A.2) gives the expressions for dx=dt ´ xt and dy=dt ´ yt
in eq. (14) of the main text.
Origin Principle [eq. (24)]: To obtain the e®ects of a domestic tax increase in
the home market we totally di®erentiate the ¯rst-order conditions ¦x(x;y;t) = 0
and ¦¤


















Similarly the e®ects of a domestic tax increase in the foreign market are obtained
by totally di®erentiating ¦¤








































25where jJj is given in (10) and jJ¤j = ¦x¤x¤¦y¤y¤ ¡ ¦x¤y¤¦y¤x¤ is the analogous
Jacobian for the foreign market.
The relevant second-order derivatives of the pro¯t functions ¦ and ¦¤ are obtained





















¤ < 0: (A.6)
Substituting (A.6) in (A.5) yields the results summarized in eq. (24) of the main
text.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The proof is based on the ¯rst-order condition for national welfare maximization








0(2xt + yt)y + y + t (xt + yt) + sxt:
We now evaluate this expression at the equilibrium tax rate under the origin prin-
ciple. Since the second-order conditions of the government's maximization problem
are assumed to hold under both tax principles, WD
t must be continuous and quasi-
concave in t. We can then infer that ^ tD > ^ tO when WD
t
¯ ¯




t=^ tO < 0. Setting t equal to ^ tO in (23), using the comparative static results (14)
and expanding by jJj as given in (10) yields
W
D
t (t = t










3p0 + p00(x + y)
4p0 + p00(x + y)
¸
: (A.7)
From strategic substitutability [eq. (9)] the ¯rst term is unambiguously positive for




t=^ tO > 0 if s = 0 or if p00 · 0. This demonstrates part (a) of the proposition.
For part (b), note that a large level of s implies that y is small and hence the ¯rst
positive term becomes small. Furthermore, the second term (which is negative if
p00 > 0) increases with s and decreases with y in absolute terms. Hence, a su±ciently
large s exists such that the second term dominates the ¯rst for all levels of trade
costs above this value, giving WD
t
¯ ¯
t=^ tO < 0. 2
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